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The focus of this paper is to present a game theoretical modeling framework for the integration of unmanned
aircraft systems into the National Airspace System. The problem of predicting the outcome of complex scenarios,
where manned and unmanned air vehicles coexist, is the research problem of this work. The fundamental gap in the
literature is that the models of interaction between manned and unmanned vehicles are insufficient: 1) They assume
that pilot behavior is known a priori, and 2) They disregard pilot reaction and the decision-making process. The
contribution of this paper is to propose a realistic modeling framework that will fill this gap. The foundations of the
proposedmethodare formedbygame theory,which investigates strategic decisionmakingbetween intelligent agents;
bounded rationality concept, which is based on the fact that humans cannot always make perfect decisions; and
reinforcement learning, which is shown to be effective in human learning in psychology literature. An analysis of
integration is conducted using an example scenario in the presence of manned aircraft and fully autonomous




Q = value function for state-action pairs
R = minimum safety distance, nm
r = relative position vector between the unmanned aircraft
system and the intruder, nm
rm = minimum relative position vector between the unmanned
aircraft system and the intruder, nm
r0 = initial relative position vector between the unmanned
aircraft system and the intruder, nm
s = state
V = value function for states
ϵ = learning rate
ζ = angle between r and vAB, rad
v = velocity vector, m∕s
vA = velocity vector of the unmanned aircraft system, m∕s
vB = velocity vector of the intruder, m∕s
vAB = relative velocity vector between the unmanned aircraft
system and the intruder, m∕s
vx = X component of the velocity vector, m∕s
vy = Y component of the velocity vector, m∕s
vdA = velocity adjustment command vector for the unmanned
aircraft system, m∕s
π· = policy
Ψ = heading angle, rad
Ψd = desired heading angle, rad
I. Introduction
D UE to their operational capabilities and cost advantages, theinterest in unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) is increasing
rapidly. However, the UAS industry has not realized its potential as
much as desired (for example, a fully developed civilian UASmarket
still does not exist), and the biggest reason behind this is thought to be
that UASs still do not have routine access to the National Airspace
System (NAS) [1]. UASs can fly only in segregated airspace with
restricting rules, because technologies, standards, and procedures for
a safe integration of UASs into airspace have not matured yet. The
aviation industry is very sensitive to risk, and for newvehicles such as
UASs to enter into this sector, they need to be proven to be safe and it
must be shown that theywill not affect the existing airspace system in
any negative way [2,3]. This needs to be done before giving UASs
unrestricted access to the NAS. Since the routine access of UASs into
the NAS is not a reality yet, and thus there is not enough experience
accumulated about the issue, it is extremely hard to predict the effects
of the technologies and concepts that are developed for the
integration. Therefore, employing simulations is currently the only
way to understand the effects of UAS integration on the air traffic
system [4]. These simulation studies need to be conducted with
realistic hybrid airspace system (HAS) models, where manned and
unmanned vehicles coexist.
Many existing HAS models in the literature are based on the
assumption that the pilots of manned aircraft always behave as they
should, without ever deviating from the ideal behavior. However, it is
not realistic to expect that the pilot, as a decision maker (DM), will
always behave deterministically. It is not always predictable, for
example, whether a pilot agrees with a traffic control alert system’s
(TCAS’s) resolution advisory or not [5]. The collision between two
aircraft (a DHL Boeing 757 and a Bashkirian Tupolev 154) over
Uberlingen, Germany, near the Swiss border at 21:35 (Coordinated
Universal Time) on 1 July 2002, is good evidence that pilots may
decide not to act parallel to a TCAS advisory or may ignore traffic
controller’s commands during high-stress situations [5]. Further-
more, in a recent study, it was shown that only 13% of pilot responses
ended up matching the deterministic pilot model that was assumed
for TCASdevelopment [6,7]. In light of the preceding discussion, it is
seen that incorporating a human decision-making process in HAS
models may improve the predictive power of thesemodels. It is noted
that the rules and procedures that need to be followed by the pilots,
such as obeying TCAS commands and its pilot model predictions
100% of the time, can also be incorporated into the game theoretical
modeling framework that is proposed in this paper.
One of the primary impediments that hinders the integration of
UASs into NAS is the lack of a matured sense-and-avoid (SAA)
capability. For a SAAmethod to be approved, it should be analyzed in
order to determine its potential impact on the surrounding air traffic
and on the specific UAS mission. To perform an analysis and
evaluation of any SAA logic, it is necessary tomodel the actions that a
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pilot would take when facing a conflict [8]. There are various studies
in the literature that use HAS models to evaluate the safety of SAA
systems. In their work [8], Maki et al. constructed a SAA logic based
on the model developed by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory [9] and Kuchar et al. [10]
did a rigorous analysis of the TCAS to implement the SAA algorithm
for remotely piloted vehicles. In both of these studies, the SAA
system was evaluated through simulations in a platform that used
MIT’s NAS encounter model. In the evaluations, it was assumed that
pilot decisions were known a priori and depended on the relative
motion of the adversary during a specific conflict scenario. In their
work, Perez-Batlle et al. [11] classified separation conflicts between
manned and unmanned aircraft and proposed separation maneuvers
for each class. These maneuvers awere tested in a simulation
environment, where it was assumed that the pilots would follow these
maneuvers 100% of the time. Florent et al. [12] developed a SAA
algorithm and tested it via simulations and experiments. In both of
these tests, itwas assumed that the intruding aircraft did not change its
path while the UAS was implementing the SAA algorithm. There
were other simulation studies, such as [13], that tested and evaluated
different collision avoidance algorithms, where some predefined
actions were used as pilot models. There are also substantial studies
with remotely piloted aircraft where the effects of SAA systems on
the workload and situational awareness of the pilots are investigated
via simulations and flight tests [14–16].
In this study, we build upon the aforementioned successful
approaches and incorporate human decision making into HAS
modeling. Specifically, in theHASmodel developed in this work, the
pilot behavior is not assumed to be known a priori and decisions are
obtained using 1) the bounded rationality concept, which helps
model imperfect decisions as opposed to modeling the pilot as a
perfect decision maker; and 2) reinforcement learning, which helps
model time-extended decisions as opposed to assuming one-shot
decision making. To predict pilot reactions in complex scenarios
where UASs and manned aircraft coexist, in the presence of
automation such as a SAA system, a game theoreticalmethodology is
employed, which is formally known as the semi-network-form
games [6]. Using this method, probable outcomes of HAS scenarios
are obtained that contain interacting humans (pilots) who also
interact with an UAS equipped with a SAA algorithm. The obtained
pilot model is used in close encounters, where TCAS and air traffic
management instructions can also be incorporated. To obtain realistic
pilot reactions, bounded rationality is imposed by using level-K
approach [17,18], which is a concept in game theory that models
human behavior assuming that humans think in different levels of
reasoning. In the proposed framework, pilots optimize their
trajectories based on a goal function representing their preferences
for system states. During the simulations, UASs fly autonomously
based on a preprogrammed flight plan. In these simulations, the effect
of certain system variables (such as the horizontal separation
requirement and required time to conflict for UASs) and the effect of
responsibility assignment for conflict resolutions on the safety and
performance of the HAS are analyzed (see [19] for the importance of
these variables and responsibility assignment for UAS integration.).
To enable the UASs to perform autonomously in the simulations, it is
assumed that they employ a SAA algorithm. The simulation results
are provided for two different SAA methods; in addition, these two
methods are compared quantitatively in terms of safety and
performance using the proposed modeling framework.
In prior works, the method proposed in this paper was used to
investigate small-scale scenarios (in terms of number of agents): In
[20], the dynamics between a smart grid operator and a cyber attacker
is modeled, and in [6,21,22], the dynamics between two interacting
pilots are modeled. More recently, in [23], a medium-scale scenario
with 50 interacting pilots was analyzed. In the study with 50 pilots,
the simulation environment used a gridded airspace where aircraft
moved from one grid intersection to another to represent movement.
In addition, the pilots could only observe grid intersections to see
whether or not another aircraft was nearby. All these simplifying
assumptions decreased the computational cost but also decreased the
fidelity of the simulation. In this study, the following occurs:
1) A dramatically more complex scenario in the presence of
manned and unmanned aircraft is investigated.
2) The simulation environment is not discretized and the aircraft
movements are simulated in continuous time.
3) Realistic aircraft and UAS physical models are used.
4) Initial states of the aircraft are obtained from real flight data.
Hence, a much more representative simulation environment with the
inclusion of UASs equipped with a SAA algorithm is used to obtain
probabilistic outcomes of HAS scenarios.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Sec. II, the proposed
modeling method is explained. In Sec. III, the HAS with its
components is described in detail, together with an investigation of
model validation. In Sec. IV, simulation results are provided with
detailed discussions. Finally, conclusions are provided in Sec. V.
II. Modeling Methodology
Themost challenging problem in the prediction of the outcomes of
complex scenarios where manned and unmanned aircraft coexist is
obtaining realistic pilot models. A pilot model in this paper refers to a
mapping from observations of the pilot to his/her actions. To achieve
a realistic human reaction model, certain requirements need to be
met. First, the model should not be deterministic because it is known
from everyday experience that humans do not always react exactly
the samewhen they are in a given “state.”Here, the term state refers to
the observations and thememory of the pilot. For instance, observing
that an aircraft is approaching from a certain distance is an
observation and remembering one’s own previous action is memory.
Second, pilots should show the characteristics of a strategic decision
maker,meaning that the decisionsmust be influenced by the expected
moves of other “agents.” Agents can be either the other pilots or the
automation logic of UASs. Third, the decisions emanating from the
model should not always be the best (or mathematically optimal)
decisions because it is known that human actions are less than optimal
in many situations. Finally, it should be considered that a human
DM’s predictions about other human DMs are not always correct. To
accomplish all of these requirements, level-k reasoning and
reinforcement learning are used together, forming a nonequilibrium
game theoretical solution concept. It is noted that, in this study, the
UASs are assumed to be fully autonomous.
A. Game Theoretical Modeling of Interactive Decision Making
Level-k reasoning is a game theoretical solution concept for which
the main idea is that humans have various levels of reasoning in their
decision-making process. Level 0 represents a “nonstrategic” DM
who does not take into account other DMs’ possible moves when
choosing his/her own actions. This behavior can also be named as
reflexive because it only reacts to the immediate observations. In this
study, given a state, a level-0 pilot flies an aircraft with constant speed
and heading starting from its initial position toward its destination. A
level-1 DM assumes that the other agents in the scenario are level 0
and takes actions accordingly to maximize his/her rewards. A level-2
DM takes actions as though the other DMs are level 1. In a
hierarchical manner, a level-k DM takes actions assuming that the
other DMs behave as level-(k-1) DMs.
B. Reinforcement Learning for the Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process
Reinforcement learning is a mathematical learning mechanism
that mimics the human learning process. An agent receives an
observable message of an environment’s state and then chooses an
action, which changes the environment’s state; the environment in
return encourages or punishes the agent with a scalar reinforcement
signal known as reward. Given a state, when an action increases
(decreases) the value of an objective function (reward), which defines
the goals of the agent, the probability of taking that action increases
(decreases). Reinforcement learning algorithms mostly involve
estimating two value functions: the state value function V, and the
state-action value function Q [24]. Vs, which is the value of state























































future, starting from that state. It is an estimate of how good it is for an
agent to be in a particular state. Qs; a, which is the value of taking
action “a” in state s under a particular policy, is the total amount of
reward an agent can expect to gather in the future, starting from that
state and taking that action by following the given policy. It is an
estimate of how good it is for an agent to perform a given action in a
given state.
Since the human DM as the agent in the reinforcement learning
process is not able to observe the whole environment state (i.e., the
positions of all of the aircraft in the scenario), the agent receives only
partial state information. By assuming that the environment isMarkov,
and based on the partial observability of the state information, this
problem can be generalized to a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP). In this study, the reinforcement learning algorithm
developed by Jaakkola et al. [25] is used to solve this POMDP. In this
approach, different from conventional reinforcement learning
algorithms, the agent does not need to observe all of the states for
the algorithm to converge. A POMDP value function and a Q-value
function, inwhichm anda refer to theobservablemessage of the state s









A recursive Monte Carlo strategy is used to compute the value
function and the Q-value function. It is noted that the pilot model is
given in terms of a policy π, which is a mapping from observations or
messages m to actions a. During reinforcement learning, the policy
update is calculated as follows, where the policy is updated toward π1
with an ε learning rate after each iteration:
πajm → 1 − επajm  επ1ajm (3)




Qπm; a − Vπm





π1ajmQπm; a − Vπm (4)
It is noted that the pilot model, or the policy, is obtained once the
policy converges during this iterative process.
C. Combining Game Theory with Reinforcement Learning
The method employed in this study carefully combines the two
concepts explained in the preceding sections: game theory and
reinforcement learning (RL). The method consists of two stages:
1) obtaining pilot reaction models with various levels (level k), and
2) simulating a given scenario using these models. In the first stage,
which can also be considered as the “training” stage, a level-1-type
model is trained by assigning level-0 behavior to all of the agents
except the one that is being trained. The trainee learns to react as best
as he/she can in this environment using RL. Thus, the resulting
behavior becomes a level-1 type. Similarly, a level-2 behavior is
trained by assigning level-1 behavior to all of the agents but the
trainee. This process continues until the highest desired level is
reached. Once all of the desired levels are obtained, the first stage
ends and, in the second stage, a given scenario is simulated by
assigning certain proportions of these levels to the agents in the
scenario. It is noted that, in the scenario investigated in this paper, the
pilots of the manned aircraft have level-0, level-1, and level-2
behavior types; whereas the movements of the UAS are commanded
via sense-and-avoid algorithms.
III. Components of the Hybrid Airspace Scenario
The investigated scenario consists of 180 manned aircraft with
predefined desired trajectories and an UAS that moves based on its
preprogrammed flight plan from one waypoint to another. Figure 1
shows a snapshot of this scenariowhere the small squares correspond
to manned aircraft and the large square corresponds to the UAS. The
size of the considered airspace is 600 × 300 km. The airspace is
gridded, just to make it easier to visually grasp the dimensions (two
neighboring grid points are 5 n mile away); nevertheless, all aircraft,
manned or unmanned, move in the airspace continuously. Circles
show the predetermined waypoints that the UAS is required to pass.
The lines passing through the waypoints show the predetermined
path of the UAS. It is noted that the UAS does not follow this path
exactly because it needs to deviate from its original trajectory to avoid
possible conflicts using an onboard SAA algorithm. The initial
positions, speeds, and headings of the aircraft were obtained from the
Flightradar24Web site, which provides live air traffic data.** The data
were collected from the air traffic volume on Colorado state, U.S.
airspace, on 11 March 2015. It is noted that, in the Next Generation
UAS
Fig. 1 Snapshot of the hybrid airspace scenario in the simulation platform. Each square stands for a 5 × 5 nmile area.
























































Airspace System (referred to as NextGen), air travel demand is
expected to increase dramatically; thus, traffic density is expected to
be much more than it is today. To represent this situation, the number
of aircraft in the scenario is increased by projecting various aircraft at
different altitudes to a given altitude. To handle the increase in aircraft
volume in NextGen, it is expected that new technologies and
automation will be introduced, such as the automatic dependent
surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B), which is a technology that enables
an aircraft to receive other aircraft’s identification, position, and
velocity information, as well as to send its information to others. In
the investigated scenario, it is assumed that each aircraft is equipped
with the ADS-B. It is noted that the ADS-B can also provide
information about the flight path of an aircraft, which is highly
relevant to collision avoidance. In our simulations, we provided this
crucial information by answering the following question for each
agent: In a given time window, where in my observation space do I
expect an intruding aircraft? (See Sec. III.A for details.)
A. Pilot Observations and Memory
AlthoughADS-B provides the positions and the velocities of other
aircraft, with his/her limited cognitive capabilities, a pilot cannot
possibly process all this information during his/her decision-making
process. In this study, in order to model pilot limitations, including
the limitations at visual acuity and perception depth, as well as the
limited viewing range of an aircraft, it is assumed that the pilots can
observe (or process) the information from a limited portion of the
nearby airspace. This limited portion is simulated as equal angular
portions of two cocentered circles called the “observation space,”
which is schematically depicted in Fig. 2. The radius of the inner
circle represents the pilot vision range, which is taken as 1 n mile
based on a survey executed in [26]. The radius of the outer circle is a
variable that depends on the separation requirements. Since the
standard separation for manned aviation is 3–5 n miles [11], this
radius is taken as 5 n miles. Whenever an intruder aircraft moves
toward one of the six regions of the observation space (see Fig. 2), the
pilot perceives that region as “full.”The pilot, in addition, can roughly
distinguish the approach angle of the approaching intruder.
A full region is categorized into four cases: with 1) 0 deg <
approach angle < 90 deg, 2) 90 deg < approach angle < 180 deg,
3) 180 deg < approach angle < 270 deg, and 4) 270 deg <
approach angle < 360 deg. Figure 2 depicts a typical example,
where pilot A observes that aircraft B is moving toward one of the six
regions. In this particular example, pilot A perceives the region as full
with the approach angle in the interval [90 deg,180 deg] and the rest
of the regions as “empty.” The information about the emptiness and
fullness of a region, as well as the approach angle, is fed to the
reinforcement learning algorithm simply by assigning 0 to empty
regions and 1, 2, 3, and 4 to full regions, based on the approach angle
classifications explained previously. Pilots also know the best action
that would move the aircraft closest to its trajectory [best trajectory
action (BTA)] and the best action that wouldmove the aircraft closest
to its final destination [best destination action (BDA)]. Moreover,
pilots have a memory of what their actions were at the previous time
step. Given an observation, the pilots can choose between three
actions: 45 deg left, straight, or 45 deg right, which are coded with
numbers 0, 1, and 2. Six ADS-B observations (one BTA, one BDA,
and one previous move) make up nine total inputs for the
reinforcement learning algorithm. Observations get five values: 0, 1,
2, 3, or 4. The previous move, BTA, and BDA have three dimensions
each: 45 deg left, 45 deg right, or straight. Therefore, the number of
states for which the reinforcement learning algorithm needs to assign
appropriate actions is 56 × 33  421; 875.
B. Pilot Objective Function
The goal of the reinforcement learning algorithm is to find the
optimum probability distribution among possible action choices for
each state. As explained previously, reinforcement learning achieves
this goal by evaluating actions based on their return, which is
calculated via a reward/objective function. A reward function can be
considered as a happiness function, goal function, or utility function
that represents, mathematically, the preferences of the pilot among
different states. In this paper, the pilot reward function is defined as
reward  w1  −C  w2  −S  w3  −CA
 w4  D  w5  −P  w6  −E (5)
In Eq. (5), C is the number of aircraft within the collision region.
Based on the definition provided by the Federal Aviation
Administration, the radius of collision is taken as 500 ft [27]. S is
the number of air vehicles within the separation region. The radius of
the separation region is 5 n miles [11]. CA represents whether the
aircraft is getting closer to the intruder or going away from the
intruder, and takes values of 1 for getting closer or 0 for going away.D
represents how much the aircraft gets closer to or goes away from its
destination normalized by the maximum distance it can fly in a time
step. The time step is determined based on the frequency of pilot
decisions. The average time step during reinforcement learning is
determined to be 20 s. P represents how much the aircraft gets closer
to or goes away from its ideal trajectory normalized by the maximum
distance it can fly in a time step, and E represents whether or not the
Agent A
Agent B
0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1
































































pilot makes an effort (move). E gets a value of 1 if the pilot makes a
new move and 0 otherwise.
C. Manned Aircraft Model
The initial positions, speeds and heading angles of the manned
aircraft were obtained from the Flightradar24 Web site (see
footnote **). It is assumed that all aircraft are in their en route phase of
travelwith constant speed kvk in the range of 150–550 kt. Aircraft are
controlled by their pilotswhomaydecide to change the heading angle
for 45 or−45 deg, or theymay decide to keep it unchanged.Once the
pilot gives a heading command, the aircraft moves to the desired
heading ψd in the constant speed mode. The heading change is
modeled by first-order dynamics with the standard rate turn: a turn in
which an aircraft changes its heading at a rate of 3 deg per second
(360 deg in 2 min) [28]. This is modeled as first-order dynamics with
a time constant of 10 s (45 × 1 − 1∕e∕3 ≈ 10). Therefore, the
aircraft heading dynamics can be given as
_ψ  − 1
10
× ψ − ψd (6)
and the velocity [v  vx; vy] is then obtained as
vx  kvk sinψ (7)
vy  kvk cosψ (8)
D. UAS Model
TheUAS is assumed to have the dynamics of a RQ-4Global Hawk
with an operation speed of 340 kt [29]. It moves according to its
preprogrammed flight plan and is equipped with a SAA system. The
SAA system can initiate a maneuver to keep the UAS away from
other traffic, if necessary, by commanding a velocity vector change.
Otherwise, the UAS will continue moving based on its mission plan.
Therefore, the UAS always receives a velocity command either to
satisfy its mission plan or to protect its safety. Since the UAS has a
finite settling time for velocity vector changes, the desired velocity
Vd cannot be reached instantaneously. Therefore, the velocity vector
variation dynamics of the UAS is modeled by a first-order dynamics
with a time constant of 1 s [30], which is represented as
_v  −v − vd (9)
E. Sense-and-Avoid Algorithms
To assure that the UAS can detect probable conflicts and can
autonomously perform evasive maneuvers, it should be equipped
with a SAA system. In this paper, two different SAA algorithms are
investigated. These SAA algorithms were developed by Fasano et al.
[31] (referred as SAA1) and Mujumdar and Padhi [30] (referred as
SAA2). The algorithms consist of two phases: the conflict detection
phase and the conflict resolution phase. In the detection phase, the
SAA algorithms project the trajectories of the UAS and the intruder
aircraft in time, using a predefined time interval; if the minimum
distance between the aircraft during this time is calculated to be less
than a minimum required distance R, it is determined that there will
be a conflict. The same conflict detection logic is used for both of the
SAA algorithms. To prevent the conflict, the UAS starts an evasive
maneuver in the conflict resolution phase, which is handled
differently for SAA1 and SAA2. In the SAA1 resolution phase
algorithm, a velocity adjustment is suggested that guarantees
minimum deviation from the trajectory. The velocity adjustment
command vdA for the UAS is given in the following equation:
vdA 






− sinη − ζ rkrk

 vB (10)
where vA and vB refer to the velocity vectors of the UAS and the
intruder. The relative position and velocity between the UAS and the
intruder are denoted as r and vAB, respectively. Also, ζ is the angle
between r and vAB; and η is calculated as
η  sin−1 Rkrk
In the case of multiple conflict detections, the UAS will start an
evasive maneuver to resolve the conflict that is predicted to happen
earliest. In the SAA2 algorithm, the velocity adjustment vector is
determined as given in the following equation, in which rm stands for
the minimum relative position vector between the UAS and the
intruder during the conflict:
vdA 
−vAr0 · vAB∕kvABk − R − krmkrm∕krmk
k − vAr0 · vAB∕kvABk − R − krmkrm∕krmkk
(11)
where r0 refers to the initial relative position vector between the UAS
and the intruder. In this solution strategy, the UAS moves to resolve
the conflict until it retains the minimum safe distance with the
intruder. Similar to the SAA1 algorithm, in the case of multiple
intruders, the UAS will start an evasive maneuver to resolve the
conflict that is predicted to happen earliest.
F. Model Validation
As noted earlier, since the routine access ofUASs intoNAS is not a
reality yet, and thus there is not enough experience accumulated
about the issue, it is extremely hard to predict the effects of the
technologies and concepts that are developed for the integration.
Therefore, employing a simulation is currently the only way to
understand the effects of UAS integration on the air traffic system [4].
However, regardless of whether the modeled system exists or
whether it is expected to be a reality in the future, the representative
model should be validated [32].
In the following, we break down the validation task into two steps.
In the first step, we explain that the underlying hierarchical game
theoretical modeling approach is a useful and valid approach to
model complex human interactions, based on earlier experimental
studies. In the second step, we investigate the validity of the proposed
approach for the UAS integration implementations. Since UAS
integration data are not available yet, we take a different approach in
this step: We first provide a validation methodology that can be used
to validate the proposed approach when the data for UAS integration
become available. We also explain that the proposed model has
enough degrees of freedom that can be used to obtain a predictive
model using these data. Then,we proceed to show that the trajectories
created by the proposed model are similar to that of a validated
encounter model for manned aircraft created using real radar data.
Finally, we explain a validation method called “face validation,”
which is commonly used when the modeled system is expected to be
a reality in the future, and we argue that our simulation results in the
next section can be used to apply this method.
1. Validation of the Game Theoretical Modeling Approach
In this study, we used a well-known game theoretical modeling
approach called “level-k” reasoning. The advantage of this approach
is its computational simplicity, where the intelligent agent makes
behavioral assumptions about others and then produces the best
response accordingly based on a reward function. Because of this
simplicity, in multimove scenarios, such as the ones treated in this
research, level-k reasoning provides computationally tractable
solutions. This approach not only provides a computationally
efficient solution but is also shown to be able to model complex
human interactions in experimental settings: In [17], several
experimental results were conducted using various sizes of subject
pools that were made to play different games. Using the data from
these games, models of strategic thinking were evaluated and
compared; although some performed better than others, depending
on the game type, the level-k approach was found to be “behaviorally
more plausible.” It is noted that these experimental results are cited























































theoretical approaches but, to provide real-world data showing that
the level-k modeling approach can represent real-world behavior in
complex decision-making scenarios. In the scenarios studied in this
work, the intelligent agents (pilots) are also strategic decisionmakers,
as explained in earlier sections, and they need to make decisions in a
complex environment to maximize their rewards. Therefore, the
underlying game theoretical approach can also be considered as a
good fit to the problem studied in this work.
2. Validation of the Proposed Modeling Approach for UAS Integration
Concepts
As presented in the previous section, the game theoretical
modeling approach is shown to model real-world behavior in earlier
experimental studies. In this section, we address the following
question: Can this approach be reliably used to model UAS
integration scenarios?
a. Validation Methodology. There exist several model validation
methods such as face validity, “historical data validation,” “parameter
sensitivity analysis,” and “predictive validation” [32]. Among these
methods, themost definitive technique is predictivevalidation,where
the model is used to predict the system’s behavior and then the
outputs of the model and the real system are compared. Here, we
explain two main aspects of predictive validation [9] that can be used
to validate the proposed model in this study when the UAS
integration data become available: First, relevant statistics between
the model and the real data should have reasonable agreement. For
example, for UAS integration, the average deviation of the UAS from
their intended trajectory against the type of the SAAalgorithm should
be similar between the model and the data. Similarly, the average
number of separation violations between manned and unmanned
aircraft for different kinds of SAA algorithms should match. Second,
individual encounters should show similar characteristics. For
example, the minimum separation distance between UAS and
manned aircraft, as well as pilot decisions during encounters with
similar geometry (approach angle, heading, etc.), should be able to be
predicted with reasonable accuracy by the model.
b. Comparison with a Validated Model. Since UAS integration data
are not available yet, we compared the results of the proposed model
with a manned-aircraft-only encounter model created and validated
by the Lincoln Laboratory using real radar data [9]. Sample
trajectories are given in two text files that are open to the public:
cor_ac1.txt and cor_ac2.txt. Among the encounters
provided, five of them (listed as 3rd, 16th, 23rd, 34th, and 45th
encounters) did not employ altitude or speed variations for conflict
resolution, and thus can be used for our purposes. The objective of
these comparisons is to show that the actions taken by the pilots in the
proposed game theoretical model and the validatedmodel are similar.
In addition, minimum separation distances experienced between the
aircraft and the times that the minimum separation occurs are shown
to be reasonably close to each other for the compared models, such
that the status of separation violation remains the same.
Figure 3a demonstrates aircraft trajectories during encounter
number 3, listed in cor_ac1.txt. In Fig. 3b, the same encounter
is regenerated using the proposed game theoretical model by
assigning the same initial positions, initial heading angles, and
initial speeds to two aircraft. It is seen that, although the trajectories
are not exactly the same, pilot decisions determined by the game
theoretical model are similar to the decisions provided by the
validated model. In addition, according to Fig. 3c, the minimum
separation distance is experienced after about 40 and 42 s for the
validated model and the game theoretical model, respectively; and
the difference between theminimumdistances is about 0.05 nmiles.
In this example, the pilots represented by the solid and dashed
curves are modeled as level-1 and level-0 pilots, respectively.
Figures 4–7 also show similar characteristics where the encounter
trajectories and pilot decisions are similar for the validated and
proposed models.
c. Face Validation. Face validation is a validation method used for
models that are developed for systems that are expected to be a reality
in the future, such as UAS integration models [32]. In this method,
two aspects of the model are evaluated:
1) Is the logic in the conceptual model correct?
2) Are the input–output relationships of the model reasonable?
The core ideas of the proposed framework (such as the level-k
game theoretical concept, reinforcement learning, and bounded
rationality) are supported by several references earlier in this study. In
addition, the logic of the objective function used during themodeling
process is detailed, where it is seen that the choice of the terms is
logical. Finally, in the Simulation Results and Discussion section of
this work (Sec. IV), input–output relationships of the model are
discussed at length to show that they represent reasonable system























































behavior. Therefore, the steps needed for the face validation of the
proposed method are completed.
d. Remark. It is noted that, without collecting, processing, and
analyzing real HAS data (which may be available in the near future),
as well as carefully comparing the outputs with the model using
available statistical validation tools (see [33]), the validation of the
model cannot be accepted as completed. It is important for a model to
have enough degrees of freedom so that, when discrepancies with the
real data are detected, the model can be modified accordingly to
obtain a match with the data with reasonable accuracy [33]. In this
regard, the proposed game theoretical framework is a strong
candidate for a successful UAS integration model because it contains
several degrees of freedom, such as the objective function weights
representing the importance of each term. In addition, the modular
structure of the objective function allows the designers to add/
subtract terms to achieve an agreement with the data.
IV. Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, the results of a quantitative analysis of a simulation
for UAS integration scenarios are presented. Before showing the
results for the scenario explained in the previous section, single-
encounter scenarios,where a singleUAS and a singlemanned aircraft
are in a collision path, are investigated. Later, the results for the
scenariowithmultiple encounters in a crowded airspace are shown.A
quantitative comparison between the two SAA algorithms in terms of
their performance and safety is also presented.
Fig. 5 Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number 23.























































A. Hybrid Airspace Scenarios with a Single Encounter
To investigate the reactions of a level-k pilot during a conflict with
an UAS, four single-encounter scenarios are designed. In these four
scenarios, level-1 and level-2 policies are used for themanned aircraft
pilots and the UAS follows the guidelines of the SAA1 algorithm,
which may command velocity adjustments in order for the UAS to
avoid the conflict. Apart from pilot levels, the effect of different
approach angles, which take the values of 45, 90, 135, and 180 deg,
are also investigated. Figure 8 depicts the snapshots of four cases,
where the square corresponds to the manned aircraft and the triangle
corresponds to the UAS. The track lines right behind the manned
aircraft and the UAS represent their traveled path from their initial
positions to where they stand in the snapshot. Circles show the initial
positions and destinations. The geometric size of the scenarios is
100 × 50 km. In all cases, the manned aircraft and the UAS are
heading toward a conflict that is detected by both the UAS, via its
SAA system, and the pilot 20 s before a probable miss separation. A
miss separation is declared when the relative distance becomes less
than 5 nmiles. The pilot then starts an evasive maneuver based on the
level-1 and level-2 reasoning policies, and the UAS implements its
own evasive maneuver based on the SAA1 system, for which the
working principles are explained in Sec. III.E. Figure 9 depicts the
separation distance and trajectory deviations during these single-
encounter scenarios. Comparing the performances of the level-1 and
level-2 pilots, it can be seen that the level-1 pilot maneuvers in a way
that he/she provides more separation distance than a level-2 pilot,
except for the case with a 90 deg approach angle. This, in general, is
expected because the level-1 pilot assumes that the intruder is a level-
0 decision maker who will continue his/her given path without
changing his/her direction; therefore, the level-1 DM takes the
Fig. 7 Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model and the game theoretical modeling approach for sample encounter number 45.























































responsibility of the conflict resolution himself/herself. On the other
hand, the level-2 pilot considers the intruder as a level-1DMwhowill
make maneuvers to avoid the conflict; therefore, the conflict
resolution responsibility will be shared. That is why the level-2 pilot,
in comparison with the level-1 pilot, avoids the UAS with less
separation distance. It is noted, however, that the level-1 pilot deviates
from its ideal trajectory significantlymore than the level-2 pilot. Even
in the case of a 90 deg approach angle,where theminimum separation
distance between the level-1 pilot and theUAS is slightly less than the
case with the level-2 pilot, the trajectory deviation of the level-2 pilot
is less than that of the level-1 pilot. These analyses show that the type
of pilot reaction during a conflict scenario makes a significant impact
on the results when evaluating the performances of the SAA
algorithms. The same conclusions are derived when the UAS
maneuvers based on the SAA2 logic; however, these results are
omitted to save space.
B. Hybrid Airspace Scenario with Multiple Encounters
The details of this scenario were explained in Sec. III. In this
section, the scenario is simulated to investigate 1) the effect of the
variations in the objective function parameters, 2) the effect of the
distance and the time horizons, and 3) the effect of responsibility
assignment for conflict resolution on safety and performance. Since
the loss of separation is the most serious issue, the safety metric is
taken as the number of separationviolations between theUAS and the
manned aircraft. Performance metrics, on the other hand, include
1) averaged manned aircraft trajectory deviations, 2) UAS trajectory
deviation, and 3) total flight time of theUAS. In all of the simulations,
level-0, level-1, and level-2 pilot policies are randomly distributed
over themanned aircraft in such away that 10%of the pilots fly based
on level-0 policies, 60%of the pilots act based on level-1 policies, and
30% use level-2 policies. This distribution is based on the
experimental results discussed in [17]. It is noted that, although the
a) Level-1 pilot, approach angle 45° b) Level-1 pilot, approach angle 90°
c) Level-1 pilot, approach angle 135° d) Level-1 pilot, approach angle 180°
e) Level-2 pilot, approach angle 45° f) Level-2 pilot, approach angle 90°
g) Level-2 pilot, approach angle 135° h) Level-2 pilot, approach angle 180°























































given distribution is obtained from human experimental studies, the
studies did not necessarily include pilots, and therefore may not be
fully representative but can easily be adapted to other distributional
data for this framework.
1. Sensitivity Analyses of the Weighting Parameters in the Objective
Function
In this section, the sensitivity of the pilot model to its parameters,
which are the weight vector components of the objective function in
Eq. (5), is investigated. Specifically, the effect of the ratio of the sum
of theweights of the safety components of the objective function over
the sum of the weights of the performance components
r  w1 w2 w3
w4 w5 w6
is investigated for various traffic densities. The results of this analysis
for various traffic densities in the HAS are depicted in Fig. 10. It is
seen that, as r increases, the trajectory deviations of both the manned
aircraft and the UAS increase, regardless of the traffic density.
Cooperation of the manned aircraft and the UAS to resolve the
conflict reduces the number of separation violations up to a certain
value of r. However, the number of violations starts increasing with a
further increase in r. What this means is that, as pilots become more
sensitive about their safety and start to overreact to probable conflicts
with extreme deviations from their trajectories, the traffic is affected
in a negative way.
Figure 11 presents the effect of increasing the ratio r in a single-
encounter scenario where surrounding traffic does not exist. The
percentage values provided in the figure is obtained for 5000
encounters. For each r value, these 5000 encounter “episodes” are
repeated 1000 times to obtain reliable statistics. As expected, in the
absence of surrounding traffic, the increase in the ratio r decreases the
number of separation violations.
Remark: In this study, it is emphasized that humans are not
expected to behave optimally in complex situations in the presence of
multiple decision makers and automation due to 1) limited
observation space, 2) limited processing power, and 3) limited
information about other decision makers. The exploited modeling
framework captures this suboptimal pilot response using several tools
explained in earlier sections, including the RL algorithm, which
provides convergence guarantees to a local maximum. The pilot
behavior we observe in Fig. 10 is an example of suboptimal behavior
where, in the presence of surrounding traffic, increased safety
parameter weights (after a certain point) can cause extreme trajectory
deviations and increased separation violations. Figure 11, on the
Fig. 9 Safety vs performance of level-k pilot interacting with UAS.























































other hand, presents the expected behavior of decreasing violations
with increased safety weights, when the scenario is much simpler.
2. Effect of Distance and Time Horizons on Performance and Safety
Although the standard separation distance for manned aviation is
3–5 n miles [11], UASs might require wider separation requirements
compared to manned aircraft. In the following analysis, horizontal
separation requirement for the UAS is called the distance horizon,
and the effect of it is reflected into the simulation by defining this
value as the “scan radius” for the SAAalgorithm: The SAAalgorithm
considers an intruding aircraft as a possible threat only if the aircraft is
within the scan radius. Another variable for which the effect is
investigated is defined as the time to separationviolation and is called
the time horizon. In the simulation, the time horizon is used as the
time interval, within which the UAS predicts a probable conflict.
Figures 12 and 13 show the effects of the time horizon and the
distance horizon on the safety and performance of the system, when
SAA1 and SAA2 algorithms are used, respectively. When the SAA1
algorithm is employed, it is seen in Fig. 12 that increasing the distance
horizon of theUASmakes the SAA1 systemdetect probable conflicts
from a larger distance, which in turn increases the UAS trajectory
deviation. Increasing the time horizon makes a similar effect on
trajectory deviation. A high UAS trajectory deviation results in
higher flight times for the UAS to complete its mission. In addition,
higher distance and time horizons reduce the trajectory deviations of
the manned aircraft because conflicts are resolved mostly by the
UAS. When the UAS foresees the probable conflicts earlier (with
increased time and distance horizons), the number of separation
violations generally decreases. Increasing the distance and time
horizons after a certain point does not improve the safety (number of
separation violations), because the UAS starts to disturb the traffic
unnecessarily due to the overreactions of the SAA system.
The first observation that strikes the eye in the case of SAA2
system utilization (see Fig. 13) is that the time horizon variations do
not affect the results as much as the case of SAA1 system utilization.
The second important difference of the SAA2 algorithm is that
increasing the distance horizon consistently improves the safety
(Fig. 13d), unlike the case of SAA1 algorithm utilization, where
larger distance horizon values do not make a major effect on safety.
The reason for this difference can be explained by comparing
Figs. 12b and 13b: SAA1 causes the UAS deviate from its trajectory
significantly more than the SAA2, and thus separation violation
numbers for the SAA1 do not improve further after a point due to a
significant impact on the surrounding traffic. However, it should be
noted that, in general, the violation numbers of the SAA1 are lower
than that of the SAA2 (see Figs. 12d–13d). After this quantitative
analysis, it can be said that the SAA1 system results in a safer flight
(less number of violations), whereas the SAA2 system provides a
higher-performance flight (lower deviations from the trajectory).
It is important to note that, when the technologies and procedures
mature enough to enable full integration of UAS into the NAS, it
would not be unrealistic to expect that the ratio of unmanned to
manned aircraft will increase dramatically. Since the HAS is a
complex system where several intelligent agents move simulta-
neously, it is impossible to predict the effects of increased UAS
presence. Therefore, it is important and useful to investigate the
response of the overall system to the increased number of UASs.
Figure 14 shows the effect of increasing the number ofUASs inHAS.
It is seen that, as the number of UASs increases, trajectory deviations,
flight times, and separation violations increase. It is noted that no
mode/phase changes are observed in the system.
3. Separation Responsibility Analysis
Another issue to be addressed that is important in studying the
integration ofUAS intoNAS is the separation responsibility [19]: it is
crucial to determine which of the agents (manned aircraft or UAS)
will take the responsibility of conflict resolution. Figure 15 depicts a
Fig. 11 Pilot model sensitivity analysis for the single-encounter
scenario.























































comparison of different resolution responsibility cases: manned
aircraft are responsible, both manned aircraft and the UAS are
responsible, and only the UAS is responsible. In the case when only
manned aircraft are responsible for conflict resolution, the UAS is
forced to continue its path without executing the SAA system and
the manned aircraft act as level-1 and level-2 DMs. In the casewhen
the UAS is responsible for the conflict resolution, the manned
aircraft are forced to continue their path without changing their
heading, and the UAS executes its SAA system. In the case when
both the manned aircraft and the UAS are responsible for the
conflict resolution, they both execute their evasive maneuvers.
Figure 15a shows that manned aircraft deviate more from their
trajectory when both the UAS and the manned aircraft share
resolution responsibility, as compared to the case when only the
manned aircraft are responsible. This is true for both the SAA1 (the
results on the left) and the SAA2 (the results on the right)
algorithms. The reason for increased trajectory deviation for the
manned aircraft in the case of shared responsibility is that the pilots’
assumptions about possible UAS actions are not always correct,
which forces the pilots to make additional adjustments in their
Fig. 13 Safety vs performance in HAS when the SAA2 is employed.
























































trajectory, which in turn increases manned aircraft trajectory
deviations.
On the other hand, Fig. 15b shows that the UAS deviates from its
trajectory morewhen it is responsible for the resolution, as compared
to the casewhen the responsibility is shared, when the SAA1 is used.
For the case of SAA2 utilization, deviations are less and do not
change much based on the responsibility assignments. Figure 15c
shows, as expected, that for both the SAA1 and SAA2, theUAS flight
times are the shortest when only the manned aircraft become
responsible for the resolution. Perhaps the most important result is
given in Fig. 15d, where it is shown that, for both SAA1 and SAA2
utilizations, the safest case is when the resolution responsibility is
given to the UAS.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, a game theoretical modeling framework is proposed
for use in the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the
National Airspace System as a means for concept evaluations. The
method provides probabilistic outcomes of complex scenarios where
both manned and unmanned aircraft coexist. Thus, by providing
quantitative analyses, the proposed framework proves itself to be
useful in investigating the effect of various system variables, such as
separation distances and the utilization of different sense-and-avoid
algorithms, on the safety and performance of the airspace system.The
method can also be used to analyze the effect of responsibility
assignment for conflict resolution, between manned and unmanned
aircraft. The proposed framework is flexible so that any rules and
procedures that the pilots are required to follow (for example, traffic
control alert systems advisories) can be incorporated into the model.
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